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will; lie was dcclarcd not to be a seaman being at sea. ' I lie decisions do 
not seem reconcilable.
The Court however applied In The Goods of Hale; the result of 
the application it seems, widens the scope of the already liberal inter­
pretation given by the Courts to the term “mariner or seaman being 
at sea”.
Terence V . Kelly, Law III U .N .B.
Re E L L IO T T  (deceased). LLO Y D S BANK, L T D . v. B U R TO N  -  
O N —T R E N T  H O SPITA L M A N A G EM EN T C O M M IT T E E
AND O T H E R S
W ill — Condition Precedent — Illegal Condition — G ift of Personality 
Subject Thereto — Malum Prohibitum and not Malum In Se -- 
Validity of G ift
The recent case of Re Elliott (deceased) Lloyd’s Bank l  td. v. 
Burton-On-Trent Hospital Management Committee et A1 (1952) 
1 A.E.R. 145, is of interest. It provides an example of the adoption 
by courts of equity of a civil law doctrine involving the distinction of 
malum in se and malum prohibitum in reference to conditions pre­
cedent and personal property.
*•
The facts of the ease are that the testator, Arthur Elliott, by 
his will appointed the plaintiff bank to be executor and trustee and 
directed the bank to convert the whole of his estate, both real and 
personal, into money. After payment of his debts and funeral and 
testamentary expenses, he gave the sum of £100 to the Burton-On- 
Trent Infirmary to be invested as the trustee should direct “for the 
purpose of maintaining and renovating my grave and headstone, sub­
ject to the Burton-On-Trent Infirmary accepting the above £100 and 
the terms as above attaching thereto then I give to the said Burton- 
On-Trent Infirmary the rest, residue and remainder of my estate to 
be applied to the general purposes of the said infirmary.”
From the facts it will be apparent that this was not an absolute 
gift but rather a gift subject to a condition precedent under which the 
infirmary was to take the residue only if it accepted the legacy of 
£100 and also the terms, which were to maintain and renovate the 
testator’s grave and headstone.
The Court held that on construction of the will, the legacy of 
£100 was intended to be set apart in perpetuity for maintaining the 
testator’s grave, and, therefore, it was void as transgressing the rule 
against perpetuities and thus the condition precedent attached to 
the gift of residue was an illegal one which the residuary legatee 
could not lawfully carry into effect.
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’I lie question arose whether the illegality of the condition avoided 
the gift of residue or whether the illegal condition could he avoided. 
It was in this connection that the civil law distinction between malum 
in sc and malum prohibitum was introduced.
Bouvicr’s Law Dictionary (Century Edition) states that “an 
offence malum in se is one which is naturally evil, as murder, theft, 
and the like. An offencc malum prohibitum, on the contrary, is 
not naturally an evil, but bccamc so in consequence of its being for­
bidden, as 'plaving at games which being innocent before, have 
become unlawful in consequence of being forbidden.”
The distinction has arisen in cases concerning illegality of con­
tract, but Pollock on Contracts (13th Ed.) in discussing the effect 
of prohibitory statutes on agreements says at page 274 “W hen a 
transaction is forbidden, the grounds of the prohibition are imma­
terial. Courts of Justice cannot take note of any difference between 
mala prohibita (i.e. things which if not forbidden bv positive law 
would not be immoral) and mala in se (i.e. things which arc so for­
bidden as being immoral).”
In the field of personal property, however, it would seem from 
the cases cited by Harman, J. in the judgment of the case under dis­
cussion, that the distinction has not been altogether abandoned.
Mr. Justicc Harman first emphasizes the fact that if this had 
been a gift of real property, failure to perform the condition must 
have avoided the gift, and he citcs the case of Egerton v. Earl Brown- 
low (1).
The judge goes on to point out that when gifts of personalty 
are in question, different rules apply and he relies to a great extent 
on dicta in Re Moore (2). He cites Cotton, L. J., who cites from 
Jarman on W ills, (3): “The rule is thus stated by Mr. Jarman: ‘But 
with respcct to legacies out of personal estate, the civil law, which in 
this respcct has been adopted by courts of equity, differs in some 
respects from the common law in its treatment of conditions pre­
cedent; the rule of the civil law being that where a condition prc- 
ccdcnt is originall impossible, or is made so bv the act or default of 
the testator, or is illegal as involving malum prohibitum, the bequest 
is absolute, just, as if the condition had been subsequent. But where 
the performance of the condition is the sole motive of the bequest, 
or its impossibility was unknown to the testator, or the condition 
which was possible in its creation has since bccomc impossible bv 
the act of God, or where it is illegal as involving malum in se, in 
these eases the civil agrees with the common law in holding both 
gift and condition void.’ According to English law if a condition 
subsequent which is to defeat an estate, is against the policy of the 
law, the gift is absolute, but if the illegal condition is precedent 
there is no gift. In the civil law a distinction is taken between what 
is malum in sc and what is only malum prohibitum . .
O ' <18531 10 E.R. 359.
12 ' il888> 39 Ch. D 116 
i3 ' 4th E d , V ol. 11. p 12.
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Later in the judgment Mr. Justice Harman cites a passage from 
Roper 011 Legacies, (4) to the cffcct that if the illegality of tne con­
dition precedent involves malum in se the disposition is void, but 
if it be merely malum prohibitum, then the condition is void and 
the bequest good.
The learned judge continues “The present illegality is of the 
second kind, and therefore, if this doctrine of the civil law has been 
imported into the English law, the condition can be disregarded. Mr. 
Roper is of the opinion that this rule was imported into eciuity, and 
for this there appears to be the authority of Lord Hardwiclce, L. C. 
(3 Atk. 332) in Kevnish v. Martin, quoted and accepted bv Bowen, 
L. J. (39 Ch. D. 1 *35) in Re Moore, (supra).
Mr. Justice l!?rman concluded that the condition is avoided; 
the gift is unfettered and the first defendant can take the residue 
and disregard the condition.
Just how far this distinction is applicable in Canada would 
seem to be doubtful in the light of tne decision of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in Re Going. (*>) In this case a testatrix attached to 
a gift of pcrsonaltv to two nephews a condition precedent to the effcct 
that tliev were to be “members and adherents in good faith and 
standing of a Protestant church . .
Although the validity of this condition was attacked on the 
ground of public policy the Court did not attempt to consider the 
question of illegality.
D. G. Farquharson, Q.C., in an illuminating note (6) says: “The 
court found that the condition was clearly a condition precedent 
and did not consider it necessary to decide whether the condition 
was or was not illegal since the court held:
It is plain from  the language of the W ill th a t it was the in tention »if 
the testatrix  th at if the gift to  h er nephews failed the whole of the  
fund to be set aside by her execu tors under p aragrap h  5 of her will 
should go to the Pension Fu n d  of T h e  U n ited  C h u rch  of C anada. 
T h u s, if the gift to the nephew s fails because th e cond ition  ann exed  
to  it is void, as contended by th eir counsel the Pension Fu n d  of the  
U n ited  C h u rch  is entitled  to  it. If the cond ition  is a valid on e, the  
fund likewise goes to  th at beneficiary because n eith er of the nephews 
of the testatrix  had com plied w ith the cond ition and the tim e p erm itted  
for doing so had  passed.”
Mr. Farquharson goes on to comment, “It is clear from this passage 
that the court was of the opinion that, if the condition was illegal, 
the gift to which it was attached failed with it ”
In Re Going, the court had also referred to a statement of 
Middleton, J. A. in Re Gross (7). There, Middleton J. A., had citcd 
a statement by Lord Sterndalc in In Re Wallace (8). Then Lord
• 4) 4th  E d ., V ol. I ,  p. 757.
<5i (1951) O .R . 147.
(61. 29 C .B .R . 434.
(7» (19371 O.W .N . 88.18) (1920) 2 Ch. 274.
34 U .N . B. LAW  JOURNAL
Stcrndalc had said: “This condition is clcarlv a condition prcccdcnt 
and in that ease if a condition be void as against public policy, the 
gift fails.”
Mr. Farquharson has this to sav concerning the above citation: 
“W ith dcfcrcncc to the definite views expressed bv Middleton. J. A., 
it is suggested that the English courts differentiate between such 
conditions attached to devises of real propcrtv and to bequests of 
personalty, and between failure of the condition as malum prohibitum 
and as malum in se. The statement quoted bv Middleton, J. A. from 
the Wallace case was at most a dictum, because the court there held 
the condition to be valid.”
Mr. Farquharson goes on to discuss the English approach to the 
problem in much the same fashion as did Jarman, J. in the case which 
forms the subject of this present note, and he concludes, “Since the 
Ontario Court of Appeal in Re Going did not find it necessary to 
consider the validity of the condition, much less to consider whether 
it was illegal as involving malum prohibitum or malum in se, it must 
be assumed that in Ontario anv gift of personalty fails, if it is at­
tached to a condition precedent wliich is illegal as contrary to public 
policy.”
W hile the decision in Re Elliott could hardly be said to be one 
of outstanding importance, it does throw some interesting light on 
the importation into the law of Knglancl of a civil law doctrinc in­
volving the distinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum.' 
As for its application in Canada, and particularly in Ontario, it is still 
doubtful, since the decision in Re Going, whether such an importa­
tion has taken place.
Dennis Townsend, Law II
C A R R  & C A R R
Barristers and Solicitors, Etc.
H U G H  A .  C A R R .  O . C .  A. G O R D O N  C A R R .  B . C . L .
O F F I C E :  M O W A T  B U I L D I N G  P . O .  B O X  182
CAMPBELLTON, N. B.
